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SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro Security Guide
SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro 5.5

SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro Security Guide

WHAT?

This book describes the basics of SELinux and remote attestation using Keylime, and focuses on securing local access to a machine using PAM.

WHY?

You would like to be introduced to security solutions available on SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro.

EFFORT

The SELinux topic takes approx. 40 minutes to read. The PAM configuration takes approx. 20 minutes to read. The Keylime attestation takes approx. 15 minutes.

GOAL

A better understanding of SELinux, PAM and Keylime.

Publication Date: 18 Jun 2026

1 SELinux

1.1 About SELinux

SELinux was developed as an additional Linux security solution that uses the security framework in the Linux kernel. The purpose was to allow for a more granular security policy that goes beyond the standard Discretionary Access Controls (DAC), the traditional file permissions of owner/group/world, and read/write/execute.

SELinux uses labels attached to objects (for example, files and network sockets) to make access control decisions.

The default action of SELinux is to deny any access. SELinux allows only actions that were specifically allowed in the SELinux policy. Another feature of SELinux that increases security is that SELinux allows strict confinement of processes up to the point where the processes cannot access files of other processes on the same system.

SELinux was designed to enhance existing security solutions, not to replace them. For example, discretionary access control (DAC) is still applied, even if the system is using SELinux. If DAC denies access first, SELinux is then not used as the access was already blocked by another mechanism.

1.2 Getting SELinux

SELinux is installed by default when installing SLE Micro by YaST or is part of the pre-built images.

If SELinux is not set up on your system, run the following command:

# transactional-update setup-selinux

Reboot your system after the command has finished. The command installs the SELinux policy if it is not installed, sets the enforcing SELinux mode and rebuilds initrd.

1.3 SELinux modes

SELinux can run in one of three modes: disabled, permissive or enforcing.

Using the disabled mode means that no rules from the SELinux policy are applied and your system is not protected. Therefore, we do not recommend using the disabled mode.

In the permissive mode, SELinux is active, the security policy is loaded, the file system is labeled and access denial entries are logged. However, the policy is not enforced and thus no access is actually denied.

In the enforced mode, the security policy is applied. Each access that is not explicitly allowed by the policy is denied. This is the default SELinux mode on SLE Micro, regardless of the deployment type.

For information about switching between SELinux modes, refer to Section 1.3.1, “Changing the SELinux mode”.

1.3.1 Changing the SELinux mode

You can switch the SELinux mode temporarily or permanently.

1.3.1.1 Changing the SELinux mode temporarily

To set SELinux to the permissive or enforcing mode temporarily, use the command setenforce.

The setenforce command has the following syntax:

# setenforce MODE_ID

where MODE_ID is 0 for the permissive mode or 1 for the enforced mode.

Remember that you cannot disable SELinux using the setenforce command.

1.3.1.2 Changing the SELinux mode permanently

To perform changes to the SELinux mode that persists rebooting of the system, edit the /etc/selinux/config configuration file. In this file, you can also disable SELinux on your system. However, this action is not recommended. If SELinux is possibly causing issues to your system, switch to the permissive mode instead and debug your system.

In the file /etc/selinux/config, change the value of SELINUX to disabled, or permissive, or enforced as follows:

SELINUX=disabled

The changes in the file are applied after the next reboot.

Note
Note: Relabeling your system after switching from the disabled mode

If you disable SELinux on your system and then enable it later, make sure that you relabel your system. When SELinux is disabled and you perform changes to your file system, the changes are not reflected in the context anymore (for example, new files do not have any context). Therefore, you need to relabel your system by using the restorecon command, using the autorelabel boot parameter, or by creating a file that will trigger relabeling on the next boot. To create the file, run the following command:

# touch /etc/selinux/.autorelabel

After reboot, the file /etc/selinux/.autorelabel is replaced with another flag file, /etc/selinux/.relabelled, to prevent relabeling on subsequent reboots.

1.3.1.3 Verifying the active SELinux mode

To verify the mode, run the following command:

# getenforce

The command should return permissive or enforced, depending on the provided MODE_ID.

1.3.2 Verifying that SELinux is functional

If you are performing configuration changes, it may be useful to switch to permissive mode. During this time, users might label files incorrectly, and thus cause problems when switching back to enforcing mode.

To return the system back to its secured state, perform the following steps:

  1. Reset the security context:

    > sudo restorecon -R /
  2. Switch to enforcing mode by setting SELINUX=enforcing in the /etc/selinux/config.

  3. Reboot the system and log in again.

  4. Run the sestatus -v command. It should give you an output similar to the following one:

    > sudo sestatus -v
    SELinux status:                 enabled
    SELinuxfs mount:                /sys/fs/selinux
    SELinux root directory:         /etc/selinux
    Loaded policy name:             targeted
    Current mode:                   enforcing
    Mode from config file:          enforcing
    Policy MLS status:              enabled
    Policy deny_unknown status:     allowed
    Memory protection checking:     requested(insecure)
    Max kernel policy version:      33
    
    Process contexts:
    Current context:                unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
    Init context:                   system_u:system_r:init_t:s0
    /usr/sbin/sshd                  system_u:system_r:sshd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
    
    File contexts:
    Controlling terminal:           unconfined_u:object_r:user_tty_device_t:s0
    /etc/passwd                     system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t:s0
    /etc/shadow                     system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0
    /bin/bash                       system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t:s0 \
                                    -> system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t:s0
    /bin/login                      system_u:object_r:login_exec_t:s0
    /bin/sh                         system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 \
                                    -> system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t:s0
    /sbin/agetty                    system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 \
                                    -> system_u:object_r:getty_exec_t:s0
    /sbin/init                      system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0 -> \
                                    system_u:object_r:init_exec_t:s0
    /usr/sbin/sshd                  system_u:object_r:sshd_exec_t:s0
  5. If the system is not working properly, check the log files in /var/log/audit/audit.log. For more details, refer to SELinux troubleshooting.

1.4 SELinux security context

The security context is a set of information assigned to a file or a process. It consists of SELinux user, role, type, level and category. This information is used to make access control decisions.

SELinux context fields
SELinux user

An identity defined in the policy that is authorized for a specific set of roles and for a specific level range. Each Linux user is mapped to only one SELinux user. However, one SELinux user can have several roles.

SELinux does not use the list of user accounts maintained by Linux in /etc/passwd, but uses its own database and mapping. By convention, the identity name is suffixed with _u, for example, user_u.

When a new Linux account is created and the SELinux user is not assigned to the account, the default SELinux user is used. Usually, the default value is unconfined_u. For a procedure on how to change the default value, refer to Section 1.7.5.2, “The semanage login command”.

role

Defines a set of permissions that a user can be granted. A role defines which types a user assigned to this role can access. By convention, the role name is suffixed with _r, for example, system_r.

type

The type conveys information on how particular files and processes can interact. A process consists of files with a concrete SELinux type, and it cannot access files outside of this type. By convention, the type name is suffixed with _t, for example, var_t.

level

An optional attribute that specifies the range of levels of clearance in the multilevel security.

category

An optional attribute that allows you to add categories to processes, files and users. A user can then access files that have the same category.

Here is an example of an SELinux context:

allow user_t bin_t:file {read execute gettattr};

This example rule states that the user who has the context type user_t (this user is called the source object) is allowed to access objects of the class file with the context type bin_t (the target), using the permissions read, execute and getattr.

1.5 SELinux policy overview

The policy is the key component in SELinux. Your SELinux policy defines rules that specify which objects can access which files, directories, ports and processes on a system. To do this, a security context is defined for all of these.

An SELinux policy contains a huge number of rules. To make it more manageable, policies are often split into modules. This allows the administrator to switch protection on or off for different parts of the system.

When compiling the policy for your system, you will have a choice to either work with a modular policy, or a monolithic policy, where one huge policy is used to protect everything on your system. We strongly recommend using a modular policy and not a monolithic policy. Modular policies are much easier to manage.

SLE Micro is shipped with the targeted SELinux policy.

1.5.1 Working with SELinux modules

As an administrator, you can switch modules on or off. This can be useful if you want to disable only a part of the SELinux policy and you do not want to run a specific service without SELinux protection.

To view all SELinux policy modules in use, run the command:

semodule -l

After you get the name of the module you want to switch off, run the command:

> sudo semodule -d MODULENAME

To switch on the policy module, run the command:

> sudo semodule -e MODULENAME

1.5.2 Creating policies for containers

SLE Micro is delivered with a policy that, by default, does not allow containers to access files outside the container data. On the other hand, all network access is allowed. Typically, containers are created with bind mounts and should be able to access other directories, like /home or /var. You may want a possibility to allow access to these directories or, on the contrary, restrict some ports to the container even if SELinux is used on your system. In this case, you need to create new policy rules that enable or disable the access. SLE Micro provides the Udica tool for this purpose.

The following procedure describes how to create a custom policy for your containers:

  1. Make sure that SELinux is in the enforcing mode. For details, refer to Section 1.3.1, “Changing the SELinux mode”.

  2. Start a container using the following parameters:

    # podman run -v /home:/home:rw -v /var/:/var/:rw -p 21:21 -it sle15 bash

    The container runs with the default policy that does not allow access to the mount points but does not restrict other ports.

  3. You can exit the container.

  4. Obtain the container ID:

    # podman ps -a
    
    CONTAINER ID  IMAGE                                                                              COMMAND     CREATED        STATUS            PORTS               NAMES
    e59f9d0f86f2  registry.opensuse.org/devel/bci/tumbleweed/containerfile/opensuse/bci/ruby:latest  /bin/bash   8 minutes ago  Up 8 seconds ago  0.0.0.0:21->21/tcp  zen_ramanujan
  5. Create a JSON file that Udica will use to create a custom policy for the container:

    # podman inspect e59f9d0f86f2 > OUTPUT_JSON_FILE

    For example, substitute OUTPUT_JSON_FILE with container.json.

  6. Run Udica to generate a policy according to the container parameters:

    # udica -j OUTPUT_JSON_FILE  CUSTOM_CONTAINER_POLICY

    For example:

    # udica -j container.json custom_policy
  7. According to the provided instructions, load the policy modules by running:

    # semodule -i custom_policy.cil /usr/share/udica/templates/{base_container.cil,net_container.cil,home_container.cil}
  8. Run a container with the new policy module by using the --security-opt option as follows:

    # podman run --security-opt label=type:custom_policy.process -v /home:/home:rw -v /var/:/var/:rw -p 21:21 -it sle15 bash

1.6 SELinux Booleans

SELinux Booleans support a flexible policy management approach. For example, Booleans enable you to disable a particular policy on one server, while keeping the same policy active on another one. In other words, a Boolean can be understood as a switch for a policy rule. Instead of changing a particular policy, you can switch it off. In the policy code, Booleans are called a tunable. Because Booleans are included in the policy, they are available as soon as a policy is loaded.

The changes to the Booleans value may be persistent or temporary, lasting until the end of the session.

SELinux offers tools that enable you to list and view details or change the state of Booleans. See the following sections for details.

1.6.1 Working with Booleans

1.6.1.1 Listing Booleans

You can use the getsebool or semanage command to list currently defined Booleans. To list all currently defined Booleans, along with their state, run the following command:

# getsebool -a

abrt_anon_write --> off
abrt_handle_event --> off
abrt_upload_watch_anon_write --> on
...

To get more details about particular Booleans, you can use the semanage command as follows:

# semanage boolean -l

SELinux boolean               State   Default     Description

abrt_anon_write               (off  ,  off)       Allow abrt to anon write
abrt_handle_event             (off  ,  off)       Allow abrt to handle event
abrt_upload_watch_anon_write  (on   ,   on)       Allow abrt to upload watch anon write

To get the status of an individual Boolean, you can use the following command:

# getsebool BOOLEAN_NAME

Alternatively, you can just use the grep command on the semanage boolean output:

# semanage boolean -l | grep BOOLEAN_NAME

1.6.1.2 Toggling Booleans

The commands setsebool and semanage can be used to toggle the value of Booleans. You can change the Boolean status persistently or just temporarily until the session ends. To change a Boolean value temporarily, run the following command:

# setsebool BOOLEAN_NAME BOOLEAN_VALUE

where BOOLEAN_VALUE is either on or off.

To change a Boolean value persistently, run one of the following two commands:

# setsebool -P BOOLEAN_NAME BOOLEAN_VALUE

Alternatively, using the semanage command:

# semanage boolean -m --BOOLEAN_VALUE  BOOLEAN_NAME

where BOOLEAN_VALUE is either on or off.

A single Boolean can enable or disable several policy rules. To see which policy rules are enabled or disabled by specific Booleans, use the sedispol tool to analyze the policy file:

# sedispol /etc/selinux/targeted/policy/policy.32

As the policy rules are usually huge, we recommend setting an output file by selecting the f and specifying a file name. After specifying the file name, press 6. Then you can inspect the file.

1.7 Tools for managing SELinux

SLE Micro provides you with tools to manage SELinux on your system. If the below described tools are not installed on your system, install the tools by running:

# transactional-update pkg install policycoreutils-python-utils

After successful installation, reboot the system.

1.7.1 Using the Z option

Where SELinux is installed and configured, you can use the -Z to regular commands like ls, id or ps. Using this option, you can display the security context of files or processes. For example, with the ls command:

> ls -Z /etc/shadow

        system_u:object_r:shadow_t:s0 /etc/shadow

1.7.2 The chcon command

The command name chcon stands for change context. The command can change the full security context of a file to the value provided on the CLI, or it can change parts of the context. Alternatively, you can provide a file that serves as a reference.

To change the full security context of a file, the command syntax looks as follows:

# chcon SECURITY_CONTEXT FILENAME

where:

  • SECURITY_CONTEXT is in the format: SELinux_USER:ROLE:TYPE:LEVEL:CATEGORY. For example, the context could be: system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t:s0.

  • FILENAME is a path to the file whose context should be changed.

To set a security context according to a provided file that serves as a reference, run chcon as follows:

# chcon --reference=REFERENCE_FILE FILENAME

where:

  • REFERENCE_FILE is a path to a file that should be used as a reference.

  • FILENAME is a path to the file whose context should be changed.

Alternatively, you can change only one part of the security context. The general syntax of the chcon command is as follows:

# chcon CONTEXT_OPTION CONTEXT_PART FILENAME

The options and arguments have the following meaning:

  • depending on the context part, CONTEXT_OPTION can be any of the following:

    -u resp --user

    denotes that an SELinux user context will be changed on the provided file:

    # chcon -u system_u logind.conf
    -r resp --role

    only the role part will be changed in the context of the provided file:

    # chcon -r object_r logind.conf
    -t resp --type

    only the type part will be changed in the context of the provided file:

    # chcon -t etc_t logind.conf
    -l resp --range

    only the range part of the security context will be changed:

    # chcon -l s0 logind.conf
  • CONTEXT_PART is the particular value of the security context to be set.

  • FILENAME is a path to the file whose context will be changed.

Note
Note: Using chcon on symbolic links

By default, when you change the security context on a symbolic link, the context of the link target is changed and the symbolic link context is not changed. To force chcon to change the context of the symbolic link and not the link target, use the --no-dereference option as shown below:

# chcon --no-dereference -u system_u -t etc_t network.conf

You can change the context of all files in a directory by using the recursive option:

# chcon --recursive  system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t:s0 conf.d

1.7.3 getenforce and setenforce commands

The getenforce command returns the current SELinux mode: Enforcing, Permissive or Disabled.

# getenforce

Permissive

The setenforce command temporarily changes the SELinux mode to enforcing or permissive. You cannot use this command to disable SELinux. Remember that the change persists only until the next reboot. To change the state permanently, follow the description in Section 1.3.1, “Changing the SELinux mode”.

# setenforce MODE_ID

where MODE_ID is 0 for the permissive mode or 1 for the enforced mode.

1.7.4 The fixfiles script

The script enables you to perform the following tasks with the security context:

  • check if the context is correct

  • change any incorrect file context labels

  • relabel your system if you added a new policy

The script syntax is as follows:

# fixfiles [OPTIONS] ARGUMENT

where:

  • OPTIONS can be the following:

    -l LOGFILE

    saves the output to the provided file

    -o OUTPUT_FILE

    saves to the provided output file the names of all files whose file context differs from the default

    -F

    forces a reset of context

  • ARGUMENT can be one of the following:

    check

    shows previous and current file context for an incorrect label without performing any changes

    relabel

    relabels incorrect file contexts according to the currently loaded policy

    restore

    restores incorrect file contexts to the default values

    verify

    lists all files with incorrect file context labels without performing any changes

1.7.5 The semanage command

The semanage command can be used to configure parts of the policy without the need to recompile the policy from sources. The command enables you to perform the following tasks:

  • manage Booleans by using the boolean argument. For details about Booleans, refer to Section 1.6.1, “Working with Booleans”.

  • adjust the context of files by using the fcontext argument

  • manage user mappings using the login argument

  • manage SELinux users using the user argument

  • manage SELinux policy modules using the module argument

The general command syntax looks as follows:

# semanage ARGUMENT OPTIONS [OBJECT_NAME]

where:

  • ARGUMENT is one of the following: login, user, fcontext, boolean, module.

  • OPTIONS depends on the provided ARGUMENT. Common options are described in Common options.

  • OBJECT_NAME, depending on the provided ARGUMENT, can be a login name, module name, file name or SELinux user.

Common options
-a, --add

adds a provided object

-h, --help

prints the command help

--extract

displays commands that were used to change the system (Booleans, file context, and so on)

-l, --list

lists all objects

-m, --modify

modifies the provided object

-n, --noheading

modifies the output of the listing operation by omitting headings

-s, --seuser

specifies the SELinux user

Other options are specific to particular semanage commands and are described in corresponding sections.

1.7.5.1 The semanage fcontext command

Using the semanage fcontext command, you can perform the following tasks:

  • query file context definitions

  • add contexts on files

  • add your own rules

Changes performed to the file context using the semanage fcontext command do not require modifications or recompilation of the policy.

On top of the common options described in Common options, the semanage fcontext command takes the following options:

-e, --equal

The option enables you to use the context of the provided path context to label files in a different directory (the provided target path). For example, you want to assign the same context as /home has to an alternative home directory /export/home. If you use this option, you need to provide the source path and the target path:

# semanage fcontext -a -e /home /export/home
-f, --ftype

To specify a file type. Use one of the following values:

  • a - all files, which is also the default value

  • b - a block device

  • c - a character device

  • d - a directory

  • f - regular files

  • l - a symbolic link

  • p - a named pipe

  • s - a socket

1.7.5.2 The semanage login command

The semanage login enables you the perform the following tasks:

  • Mapping of Linux users on a particular SELinux user. For example, to map the Linux user tux on sysadm_u, run the command:

    # semanage login -a -s sysadm_u tux
  • Mapping of a group of Linux users on a particular SELinux user. For example, to map users of the writers group on user_u, run the command:

    # semanage login -a -s user_u %writers

    The group is then listed in the output of semanage login -l, prefixed with the % character.

    Keep in mind that the user group should be primary because mapping SELinux users on supplementary groups may result in incompatible mappings.

    # semanage login -m -s staff_u %writers
  • Mapping of Linux users on a particular SELinux MLS/MCS security range.

  • Modifying of the already created mapping. For this purpose, just replace the -a option with -m in the previous commands.

  • Setting the default SELinux user for new Linux users. The usual default SELinux user is unconfined_u. To change the value to staff_u, run the command:

    # semanage login -m -s staff_u __default__

1.7.5.3 The semanage boolean command

The semanage boolean command is used to control Booleans in the SELinux policy.

The command synopsis looks as follows:

semanage boolean [-h] [-n]  [ --extract |
       --deleteall | --list [-C] | --modify ( --on | --off | -1 | -0 ) boolean ]

On top of the common options, you can use the following ones specific to the semanage boolean command:

--list -C

To display a list of local modifications to Booleans.

-m --on | -1

To switch the provided Boolean on.

-m --off | -0

To switch the provided Boolean off.

-D, --deleteall

To delete all local modifications to Booleans.

The most common usage of the command is to switch on or off a particular Boolean. For example, to switch on the authlogin_yubikey Boolean, run:

# semanage boolean -m on authlogin_yubikey

1.7.5.4 The semanage user command

The semanage user command controls the mapping between the SELinux user and the roles and MLS/MCS levels.

On top of the common options described in Common options, the semanage user command takes the following options:

-R [ROLES], --roles [ROLES]

A list of SELinux roles. You can enclose multiple roles within double quotes and separate them by spaces, or you can use the -R several times.

Using this command, you can perform the following tasks:

  • Listing the mapping of SELinux users on roles by running:

    # semanage user -l
  • Changing the roles assigned to the user_u SELinux user:

    # semanage user -m -R "system_r unconfined_r user_r"
  • Assigning to admin_u the role staff_r and a category s0:

    # semanage user -a -R "staff_r -r s0 admin_u
  • Creating a new SELinux user, for example, admin_u with the staff_r role. You also need to define the labeling prefix for this user by using the -P:

    # semanage user -a -R "staff_r" -P admin admin_u

1.7.5.5 The semanage module command

The semanage module command can install, remove, disable or enable SELinux policy modules.

On top of the common options described in Common options, the semanage fcontext command takes the following options:

-d, --disable

To disable the provided SELinux policy module:

# semanage module --disable MODULE_NAME
-e, --enable

To enable the provided SELinux policy module:

# semanage module --enable MODULE_NAME

1.7.6 The sestatus command

The sestatus gets the status of a system where SELinux is running.

The generic syntax of the command looks as follows:

sestatus [OPTION]

When run without any options and arguments, the command outputs the following information:

# sestatus

SELinux status:                 enabled
SELinuxfs mount:                /sys/fs/selinux
SELinux root directory:         /etc/selinux
Loaded policy name:             targeted
Current mode:                   enforcing
Mode from config file:          enforcing
Policy MLS status:              enabled
Policy deny_unknown status:     allowed
Memory protection checking:     requested (insecure)
Max kernel policy version:      33

The command can take the following options:

-b

Displays the status of Booleans on the system.

-v

Displays the security context of files and processes listed in the /etc/sestatus.conf file.

1.8 SELinux troubleshooting

1.8.1 Switching on the logging service

By default, if SELinux is the reason something is not working, a log message to this effect is sent to the /var/log/audit/audit.log file. For the message to be sent, the auditd service must be running. If you see an empty /var/log/audit.log, start the auditd service using

> sudo systemctl start auditd

and enable it in the targets of your system, using

> sudo systemctl enable auditd

1.8.2 The /var/log/audit file

The /var/log/audit file stores messages of access denials, service events and so on.

In Example 1.1: “Example lines from /etc/audit/audit.log, you can see a partial example of the contents of /var/log/audit/audit.log.

Example 1.1: Example lines from /etc/audit/audit.log
type=DAEMON_START msg=audit(1348173810.874:6248): auditd start, ver=1.7.7 format=raw kernel=3.0.13-0.27-default auid=0 pid=4235 subj=system_u:system_r:auditd_t res=success
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:292): avc:  denied  { write } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartmontools" dev=sda6 ino=581743 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=dir
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:293): avc:  denied  { remove_name } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state~" dev=sda6 ino=582390 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=dir
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:294): avc:  denied  { unlink } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state~" dev=sda6 ino=582390 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:295): avc:  denied  { rename } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state" dev=sda6 ino=582373 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:296): avc:  denied  { add_name } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state~" scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=dir
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:297): avc:  denied  { create } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state" scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:298): avc:  denied  { write open } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" name="smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state" dev=sda6 ino=582390 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:299): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" path="/var/lib/smartmontools/smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state" dev=sda6 ino=582390 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=file
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.309:300): avc:  denied  { append } for  pid=1316

A single message looks as follows:

    type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.081:299): avc:  denied  { getattr } for  pid=3426 comm="smartd" path="/var/lib/smartmontools/smartd.WDC_WD2500BEKT_75PVMT0-WD_WXC1A21E0454.ata.state" dev=sda6 ino=582390 scontext=system_u:system_r:fsdaemon_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:var_lib_t tclass=file

Every line of the message can be broken down into sections. For example, the sections in the last line are:

type=AVC:

Every SELinux-related audit log line starts with the type identification, for example, type=AVC. Note that a message with the type=SYSCALL that follows one with a different type and has the same value of msg may provide further information regarding the event.

msg=audit(1348173901.309:300):

This is the time stamp, which is written in epoch time, the number of seconds that have passed since Jan 1, 1970. You can use date -d on the part up to the dot in the epoch time notation to find out when the event happened:

> date -d @1348173901
Thu Sep 20 16:45:01 EDT 2012
avc: denied { append }:

The specific action that was denied. In this case, the system has denied the appending of data to a file. While browsing through the audit log file, you can see other system actions, such as write open, getattr and more.

for pid=1316:

the process ID of the command or process that initiated the action

comm="rsyslogd":

the specific command that was associated with that PID

name="smartmontools":

the name of the subject of the action

dev=sda6 ino=582296:

the block device and inode number of the file that was involved

scontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t:

the source context, which is the context of the initiator of the action

tclass=file:

a class identification of the subject

1.8.3 Analyzing /var/log/audit/audit.log with audit2allow

Instead of interpreting the events in /var/log/audit/audit.log yourself, you can use the audit2allow command. The command helps analyze the cryptic log messages in /var/log/audit/audit.log. An audit2allow troubleshooting session always consists of three different commands. First, you would use audit2allow -w -a to present the audit information in a more readable way. The audit2allow -w -a by default works on the audit.log file. If you want to analyze a specific message in the audit.log file, copy it to a temporary file and analyze the file with:

> sudo audit2allow -w -i FILENAME
Example 1.2: Analyzing audit messages
> sudo audit2allow -w -i testfile
type=AVC msg=audit(1348173901.309:300): avc:  denied  { append } for  pid=1316
comm="rsyslogd" name="acpid" dev=sda6 ino=582296
scontext=system_u:system_r:syslogd_t tcontext=system_u:object_r:apmd_log_t tclass=file
This was caused by:

A missing type enforcement (TE) allow rule.

To generate a loadable module to allow this access, run

> sudo audit2allow

To find out which specific rule has denied access, you can use audit2allow -a to show the enforcing rules from all events that were logged into the audit.log file, or audit2allow -i FILENAME to show it for messages that you have stored in a specific file:

Example 1.3: Viewing which lines deny access
> sudo audit2allow -i testfile
#============= syslogd_t ==============
allow syslogd_t apmd_log_t:file append;

To create an SELinux module with the name mymodule that you can load to allow the access that was previously denied, run

> sudo audit2allow -a -R -M mymodule

If you want to do this for all events that have been logged into the audit.log file, use the -a -M command arguments. To do it only for specific messages that are in a specific file, use -i -M as in the example below:

Example 1.4: Creating a policy module allowing an action previously denied
> sudo audit2allow -i testfile -M example
******************** IMPORTANT ***********************
To make this policy package active, execute:

semodule -i example.pp

As indicated by the audit2allow command, you can now run this module by using the semodule -i command, followed by the name of the module that audit2allow has created for you (example.pp in the above example).

2 PAM on SLE Micro

2.1 Introduction to PAM

System administrators and programmers often want to restrict access to certain parts of the system or to limit the use of certain functions of an application. Without PAM, applications must be adapted every time a new authentication mechanism, such as LDAP, Samba, or Kerberos, is introduced. However, this process is time-consuming and error-prone. One way to avoid these drawbacks is to separate applications from the authentication mechanism and delegate authentication to centrally managed modules. Whenever a newly required authentication scheme is needed, it is sufficient to adapt or write a suitable PAM module for use by the program in question.

The PAM concept consists of:

  • PAM modules, which are a set of shared libraries for a specific authentication mechanism.

  • A module stack with one or more PAM modules.

  • A PAM-aware service which needs authentication by using a module stack or PAM modules. Usually a service is a familiar name of the corresponding application, like login or su. The service name other is a reserved word for default rules.

  • Module arguments, with which the execution of a single PAM module can be influenced.

  • A mechanism evaluating each result of a single PAM module execution. A positive value executes the next PAM module. The way a negative value is dealt with depends on the configuration: no influence, proceed up to terminate immediately and anything in between are valid options.

2.2 Structure of PAM configuration

PAM on SLE Micro comes with a so-called directory based configuration. The set of configuration files is stored in /etc/pam.d. Every service (or program) that relies on the PAM mechanism has its own configuration file in this directory. For example, the service for sshd can be found in the /etc/pam.d/sshd file.

Note
Note: File-based configuration (/etc/pam.conf) not used on SLE Micro

The configuration of each service can be also stored in /etc/pam.conf. However, for maintenance and usability reasons, this configuration scheme is not used in SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro.

The files under /etc/pam.d/ define the PAM modules used for authentication. Each file consists of lines, which define a service, and each line consists of a maximum of four components:

TYPE  CONTROL
 MODULE_PATH  MODULE_ARGS

The components have the following meaning:

TYPE

Declares the type of the service. PAM modules are processed as stacks. Different types of modules have different purposes. For example, one module checks the password, another verifies the location from which the system is accessed, and yet another reads user-specific settings. PAM knows about four different types of modules:

auth

Check the user's authenticity, traditionally by querying a password. However, this can also be achieved with a chip card or through biometrics (for example, fingerprints or iris scan).

account

Modules of this type check if the user has general permission to use the requested service. As an example, such a check should be performed to ensure that no one can log in with the user name of an expired account.

password

The purpose of this type of module is to enable the change of an authentication token. Usually this is a password.

session

Modules of this type are responsible for managing and configuring user sessions. They are started before and after authentication to log login attempts and configure the user's specific environment.

CONTROL

Indicates the behavior of a PAM module. Each module can have the following control flags:

required

A module with this flag must be successfully processed before the authentication may proceed. After the failure of a module with the required flag, all other modules with the same flag are processed before the user receives a message about the failure of the authentication attempt.

requisite

Modules having this flag must also be processed successfully, in much the same way as a module with the required flag. However, in case of failure a module with this flag gives immediate feedback to the user and no further modules are processed. In case of success, other modules are subsequently processed, like any modules with the required flag. The requisite flag can be used as a basic filter checking for the existence of certain conditions that are essential for a correct authentication.

sufficient

After a module with this flag has been successfully processed, the requesting application receives an immediate message about the success and no further modules are processed, provided there was no preceding failure of a module with the required flag. The failure of a module with the sufficient flag has no direct consequences, in the sense that any subsequent modules are processed in their respective order.

optional

The failure or success of a module with this flag does not have any direct consequences. This can be useful for modules that are only intended to display a message (for example, to tell the user that mail has arrived) without taking any further action.

include

If this flag is given, the file specified as argument is inserted at this place.

MODULE_PATH

Contains a full file name of a PAM module. It does not need to be specified explicitly, if the module is located in the default directory /lib/security (for all 64-bit platforms supported by SUSE Linux Enterprise Micro, the directory is /lib64/security).

MODULE_ARGS

Contains a space-separated list of options to influence the behavior of a PAM module, such as debug (enables debugging) or nullok (allows the use of empty passwords).

In addition, there are global configuration files for PAM modules under /etc/security, which define the exact behavior of these modules (examples include pam_env.conf and time.conf). Every application that uses a PAM module calls a set of PAM functions, which then process the information in the configuration files and return the result to the requesting application.

To simplify the creation and maintenance of PAM modules, common default configuration files for the types auth, account, password, and session modules have been introduced. These are retrieved from every application's PAM configuration. Updates to the global PAM configuration modules in common-* are thus propagated across all PAM configuration files without requiring the administrator to update every single PAM configuration file.

The global PAM configuration files are maintained using the pam-config tool. This tool automatically adds new modules to the configuration, changes the configuration of existing ones or deletes modules (or options) from the configurations. Manual intervention in maintaining PAM configurations is minimized or no longer required.

2.2.1 An example of PAM configuration

To demonstrate a real use case example of PAM configuration, the configuration of sshd has been used in this section:

Example 2.1: PAM configuration for sshd (/etc/pam.d/sshd)
#%PAM-1.0 1
auth     requisite      pam_nologin.so                              2
auth     include        common-auth                                 3
account  requisite      pam_nologin.so                              2
account  include        common-account                              3
password include        common-password                             3
session  required       pam_loginuid.so                             4
session  include        common-session                              3
session  optional       pam_lastlog.so   silent noupdate showfailed 5

1

Declares the version of this configuration file for PAM 1.0. This is merely a convention, but could be used in the future to check the version.

2

Checks, if /etc/nologin exists. If it does, no user other than root may log in.

3

Refers to the configuration files of four module types: common-auth, common-account, common-password, and common-session. These four files hold the default configuration for each module type.

4

Sets the login UID process attribute for the process that was authenticated.

5

Displays information about the last login of a user.

By including the configuration files instead of adding each module separately to the respective PAM configuration, you automatically get an updated PAM configuration when an administrator changes the defaults.

The first include file (common-auth) calls modules of the auth type: pam_env.so, pam_gnome_keyring.so and pam_unix.so. See Example 2.2, “Default configuration for the auth section (common-auth)”. Keep in mind that the modules may differ according to your installation.

Example 2.2: Default configuration for the auth section (common-auth)
auth  required  pam_env.so                   1
auth  optional  pam_gnome_keyring.so         2
auth  required  pam_unix.so  try_first_pass 3

1

pam_env.so loads /etc/security/pam_env.conf to set the environment variables as specified in this file. It can be used to set the DISPLAY variable to the correct value, because the pam_env module knows about the location from which the login is taking place.

2

pam_gnome_keyring.so checks the user's login and password against the GNOME key ring

3

pam_unix checks the user's login and password against /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow.

The whole stack of auth modules is processed before sshd gets any feedback about whether the login has succeeded. All modules of the stack having the required control flag must be processed successfully before sshd receives a message about the positive result. If one of the modules is not successful, the entire module stack is still processed and only then is sshd notified about the negative result.

When all modules of the auth type have been successfully processed, another include statement is processed, in this case, that in Example 2.3, “Default configuration for the account section (common-account)”. common-account contains only one module, pam_unix. If pam_unix returns the result that the user exists, sshd receives a message announcing this success and the next stack of modules (password) is processed, shown in Example 2.4, “Default configuration for the password section (common-password)”.

Example 2.3: Default configuration for the account section (common-account)
account  required  pam_unix.so  try_first_pass
Example 2.4: Default configuration for the password section (common-password)
password  requisite  pam_cracklib.so
password  requisite   pam_cracklib.so  
password  required   pam_unix.so  use_authtok nullok shadow try_first_pass

Again, the PAM configuration of sshd involves only an include statement referring to the default configuration for password modules located in common-password. These modules must successfully be completed (control flags requisite and required) whenever the application requests the change of an authentication token.

Changing a password or another authentication token requires a security check. This is achieved with the pam_cracklib module. The pam_unix module used afterward carries over any old and new passwords from pam_cracklib, so the user does not need to authenticate again after changing the password. This procedure makes it impossible to circumvent the checks carried out by pam_cracklib. Whenever the account or the auth type are configured to complain about expired passwords, the password modules should also be used.

Example 2.5: Default configuration for the session section (common-session)
session  required  pam_selinux.so  close
session  optional  pam_systemd.so
session  required  pam_limits.so
session  required  pam_unix.so  try_first_pass
session  optional  pam_umask.so
session  required  pam_selinux.so  open
session  optional  pam_env.so

As the final step, the modules of the session type (bundled in the common-session file) are called to configure the session according to the settings for the user in question. The pam_limits module loads the file /etc/security/limits.conf, which may define limits on the use of certain system resources. The pam_unix module is processed again. The pam_umask module can be used to set the file mode creation mask. Since this module carries the optional flag, a failure of this module would not affect the successful completion of the entire session module stack. The session modules are called a second time when the user logs out.

2.3 Configuration of PAM modules

Some PAM modules are configurable. The configuration files are located in /etc/security. This section briefly describes the configuration files relevant to the sshd example—pam_env.conf and limits.conf.

2.3.1 pam_env.conf

pam_env.conf can be used to define a standardized environment for users that is set whenever the pam_env module is called. With it, preset environment variables using the following syntax:

VARIABLE  [DEFAULT=VALUE]  [OVERRIDE=VALUE]
VARIABLE

Name of the environment variable to set.

[DEFAULT=<value>]

Default VALUE the administrator wants to set.

[OVERRIDE=<value>]

Values that may be queried and set by pam_env, overriding the default value.

A typical example of how pam_env can be used is the adaptation of the DISPLAY variable, which is changed whenever a remote login takes place. This is shown in Example 2.6, “pam_env.conf”.

Example 2.6: pam_env.conf
REMOTEHOST  DEFAULT=localhost          OVERRIDE=@{PAM_RHOST}
DISPLAY     DEFAULT=${REMOTEHOST}:0.0  OVERRIDE=${DISPLAY}

The first line sets the value of the REMOTEHOST variable to localhost, which is used whenever pam_env cannot determine any other value. The DISPLAY variable in turn contains the value of REMOTEHOST. Find more information in the comments in /etc/security/pam_env.conf.

2.3.2 limits.conf

System limits can be set on a user or group basis in limits.conf, which is read by the pam_limits module. The file allows you to set hard limits, which may not be exceeded, and soft limits, which may be exceeded temporarily. For more information about the syntax and the options, see the comments in /etc/security/limits.conf.

2.4 Configuring PAM using pam-config

The pam-config tool helps you configure the global PAM configuration files (/etc/pam.d/common-*) and several selected application configurations. For a list of supported modules, use the pam-config --list-modules command. Use the pam-config command to maintain your PAM configuration files. Add new modules to your PAM configurations, delete other modules or modify options to these modules. When changing global PAM configuration files, no manual tweaking of the PAM setup for individual applications is required.

A simple use case for pam-config involves the following:

  1. Auto-generate a fresh unix-style PAM configuration. Let pam-config create the simplest possible setup which you can extend later on. The pam-config --create command creates a simple Unix authentication configuration. Pre-existing configuration files not maintained by pam-config are overwritten, but backup copies are kept as *.pam-config-backup.

  2. Add a new authentication method. Adding a new authentication method (for example, LDAP) to your stack of PAM modules comes down to a simple pam-config --add --ldap command. LDAP is added wherever appropriate across all common-*-pc PAM configuration files.

  3. Add debugging for test purposes. To make sure the new authentication procedure works as planned, turn on debugging for all PAM-related operations. The pam-config --add --ldap-debug turns on debugging for LDAP-related PAM operations.

  4. Query your setup. Before you finally apply your new PAM setup, check if it contains all the options you wanted to add. The pam-config --query --MODULE command lists both the type and the options for the queried PAM module.

  5. Remove the debug options. Finally, remove the debug option from your setup when you are entirely satisfied with the performance of it. The pam-config --delete --ldap-debug command turns off debugging for LDAP authentication. In case you had debugging options added for other modules, use similar commands to turn these off.

For more information on the pam-config command and the options available, refer to the manual page of pam-config(8).

2.5 Manually configuring PAM

If you prefer to manually create or maintain your PAM configuration files, make sure to disable pam-config for these files.

When you create your PAM configuration files from scratch using the pam-config --create command, it creates symbolic links from the common-* to the common-*-pc files. pam-config only modifies the common-*-pc configuration files. Removing these symbolic links effectively disables pam-config, because pam-config only operates on the common-*-pc files and these files are not put into effect without the symbolic links.

Warning
Warning: Include pam_systemd.so in configuration

If you are creating your own PAM configuration, make sure to include pam_systemd.so configured as session optional. Not including the pam_systemd.so can cause problems with systemd task limits. For details, refer to the man page of pam_systemd.so.

2.6 Configuring SLE Micro to require U2F keys for local login

To provide more security during the local login to SLE Micro, you can configure two-factor authentication using the pam-u2f framework and the U2F feature on YubiKeys and Security Keys.

To set up U2F on your SLE Micro system, you need to associate your key with your account on SLE Micro. After that, configure your system to use the key. The procedure is described in the following sections.

2.6.1 Associating the U2F key with your account

To associate your U2F key with your account, proceed as follows:

  1. Log in to your machine.

  2. Insert your U2F key.

  3. Create a directory for the U2F key configuration:

    > sudo mkdir -p ~/.config/Yubico
  4. Run the pamu2fcfg command that outputs configuration lines:

    > sudo pamu2fcfg > ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
  5. When your device begins flashing, touch the metal contact to confirm the association.

We recommend using a backup U2F device, which you can set up by running the following commands:

  1. Run:

    > sudo pamu2fcfg -n >> ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys
  2. When your device begins flashing, touch the metal contact to confirm the association.

You can move the output file from the default location to a directory that requires the sudo permission to modify the file to increase security. For example, move it to the /etc directory. To do so, follow the steps:

  1. Create a directory in /etc:

    > sudo mkdir /etc/Yubico
  2. Move the created file:

    > sudo mv ~/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys /etc/Yubico/u2f_keys
Note
Note: Placing the u2f_keys to a non-default location

If you move the output file to a different directory than is the default ($HOME/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys), you need to add the path to the /etc/pam.d/login file as described in Section 2.6.2, “Updating the PAM configuration”.

2.6.2 Updating the PAM configuration

After you have created the U2F keys configuration, you need to adjust the PAM configuration on your system.

  1. Open the file /etc/pam.d/login.

  2. Add the line auth required pam_u2f.so to the file as follows:

    #%PAM-1.0
    auth      include    common-auth
    auth      required   pam_u2f.so
    account   include    common-account
    password  include    common-password
    session   optional   pam_keyinit.so revoke
    session   include    common-session
    #session  optional   pam_xauth.so
  3. If you placed the u2f_keys file to a different location than $HOME/.config/Yubico/u2f_keys, you need to use the authfile option in the /etc/pam.d/login PAM file as follows:

    #%PAM-1.0 
    auth     requisite pam_nologin.so 
    auth     include   common-auth
    auth  required pam_u2f.so authfile=<PATH_TO_u2f_keys>
    ...

    where <PATH_TO_u2f_keys> is the absolute path to the u2f_keys file.

3 Attestation using Keylime

3.1 Remote attestation using Keylime

With the growing demand on securing devices against unauthorized changes, the use of the security mechanism called remote attestation (RA) has been experiencing significant growth. Using RA, a host (client) can authenticate its boot chain status and running software on a remote host (verifier). RA is often combined with public-key encryption (using TPM2), thus the sent information can only be read by the services that requested the attestation, and the validity of the data can be verified.

Remote attestation on SLE Micro is implemented by Keylime.

3.1.1 Terminology

Remote attestation technology uses the following terms:

Attestation key (AK)

A data signing key that proves that the data comes from a real TPM and has not been tampered with.

Core root of trust for measurement

Calculates its own hash and the hash of the next step in the boot process, initiating the chain of measurements.

Endorsement key (EK)

An encryption key that is permanently embedded in the TPM when it is manufactured. The public part of the key and the certification stored in the TPM are used to recognize a genuine TPM.

Integrity management architecture (IMA)

A kernel integrity subsystem that provides a means of detecting malicious changes to files.

Measured boot

A method with which each component in the booting sequence calculates a hash of the next one before delegating the execution of the next component. The hash extends one or several PCRs of the TPM. An event is created with the information about where the measurement took place and what was measured. Such events are collected in an event log, and, along with the extended PCR values, the events can be compared with the expected values representing a healthy system.

Platform Configuration Register (PCR)

A memory location in TPM that, for example, stores hashes of booting layers. PCR can be updated only by using the non-reversible operation: extend. A signed list of current PCR values can be obtained by the quote command on TPM, and this quote can be verified by a third party during the attestation process.

Secure boot

Each step of the booting process checks a cryptographic signature on the executable of the next step before launching it.

Trusted Platform Module (TPM)

A self-contained security cryptographic processor present in the system as hardware or implemented in the firmware that serves as a root of trust. TPM provides a PCR for storing the hashes of booting layers. A typical TPM provides several functions, like a random number generator, counters or a local clock. It also stores 24 PCRs grouped by banks per each supported cryptographic hash function (SHA1, SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512).

Note
Note

By default, TPM usage is disabled. Therefore, the measured boot does not take place. To enable the remote attestation, enable TPM in the EFI/BIOS menu.

Secure payload

A mechanism to deliver encrypted data to healthy agents. Payloads are used to provide keys, passwords, certificates, configurations or scripts that are further used by the agent.

3.1.2 What is Keylime?

Keylime is a remote attestation solution that enables you to monitor the health of remote nodes using a TPM as a root of trust for measurement. With Keylime, you can perform multiple tasks, for example:

  • Validate of the PCRs extended during the measured boot.

  • Create analysis and make assertions of the event log.

  • Make assertion of the value of any PCR in the remote system.

  • Monitor the validity of open or executed files.

  • Deliver encrypted data to verified nodes via secure payloads.

  • Execute custom scripts that are triggered when a machine fails the attested measurements.

3.1.3 Architecture

Keylime consists of an agent, a verifier, a registrar and a command-line tool (tenant). Agents are on those systems that need to be attested. The verifier and registrar are on remote systems that perform the registration and attestation of agents. Keep in mind that only the agent role is available on SLE Micro. For details about each component, refer to the following sections.

3.1.3.1 Keylime agent

The agent is a service that runs on the system that needs to be attested. The agent sends the event log, IMA hashes, and information about the measured boot to the verifier, using the local TPM as a certifier of the data validity.

When a new agent is started, it needs to register itself in the registrar first. To do so, the agent needs a TLS certificate to establish the connection. The TLS certificate is generated by the registrar, but it needs to be installed manually to the agent. After the registration, the agent sends its attestation key and the public part of the endorsement key to the registrar. The registrar responds to the agent with a challenge in a process called credential activation, which validates the TPM of the agent. Once the agent has been registered, it is ready to be enrolled for attestation.

3.1.3.2 Keylime registrar

The registrar is used to register agents that should be attested. The registrar collects the agent's attestation key, the public part of the endorsement key and the endorsement key certification, and verifies that the agent attestation key belongs to the endorsement key.

3.1.3.3 Keylime verifier

The verifier performs the actual attestation of agents and continuously pulls the required attestation data from agents (among others, the PCR values, IMA logs, and UEFI event logs).

3.1.4 Setting up the verifier, registrar and tenant

Note
Note

The container described in this article delivers control plane services verifier and registrar and a tenant command-line tool (CLI) that are part of the Keylime project.

Before you start installing and registering agents, prepare the verifier and the registrar on remote hosts, as described in the following procedure.

  1. Identify the Keylime workload image.

    # podman search keylime
    [...]
    registry.opensuse.org/devel/microos/containers/containerfile/opensuse/keylime-control-plane
  2. Pull the image from the registry.

    # podman pull\
      registry.opensuse.org/devel/microos/containers/containerfile/opensuse/keylime-control-plane:latest
  3. Create the keylime-control-plane volume to persist the database and certificates required during the attestation process.

    # podman container runlabel install \
      registry.opensuse.org/devel/microos/containers/containerfile/opensuse/keylime-control-plane:latest
  4. Start the container and related services.

    # podman container runlabel run \
      registry.opensuse.org/devel/microos/containers/containerfile/opensuse/keylime-control-plane:latest

    The keylime-control-plane container is created. It includes configured and running registrar and verifier services. Internally, the container exposes ports 8881, 8890 and 8891 to the host using the default values. Validate the firewall configuration to allow access to the ports and to allow communication between containers, because the tenant CLI requires it.

Tip
Tip

If you need to stop Keylime services, run the following command:

# podman kill keylime-control-plane-container

3.1.4.1 Monitoring Keylime services

To get the status of running containers on the host, run the following command:

# podman ps

To view the logs of Keylime services, run the following command:

# podman logs keylime-control-plane-container

3.1.4.2 Executing the tenant CLI

The tenant CLI tool is included in the container, and if the host firewall does not interfere with the ports exposed by Keylime services, you can execute it using the same image, for example:

# podman run --rm \
-v keylime-control-plane-volume:/var/lib/keylime/ \
keylime-control-plane:latest \
keylime_tenant -v 10.88.0.1 -r 10.88.0.1 --cert default -c reglist

3.1.4.3 Extracting the Keylime certificate

The first time that the Keylime container is executed, its services create a certificate required by several agents. You need to extract the certificate from the container and copy it to the agent's /var/lib/keylime/cv_ca/ directory.

# podman cp \
keylime-control-plane-container:/var/lib/keylime/cv_ca/cacert.crt
.
# scp cacert.crt
AGENT_HOST:/var/lib/keylime/cv_ca/
Tip
Tip

Find more details about installing the agent in Section 3.1.5, “Installing the agent”.

3.1.5 Installing the agent

The Keylime agent is not present on SLE Micro by default, and you need to install it manually. To install the agent, proceed as follows:

  1. Install the rust-keylime package as follows:

    # transactional-update pkg in rust-keylime

    Then reboot the system.

  2. Adjust the default agent's configuration.

    1. Create a directory to store a new configuration file for your changes in /etc/keylime/agent.conf.d/. The default configuration is stored in /usr/etc/keylime/agent.conf, but we do not recommend editing this file because it may be overwritten in upcoming system updates.

      # mkdir -p /etc/keylime/agent.conf.d
    2. Create a new file /etc/keylime/agent.conf.d/agent.conf:

      # cat << EOF > /etc/keylime/agent.conf.d/agent.conf
       [agent]
       
       uuid = "d111ec46-34d8-41af-ad56-d560bc97b2e8"1
       registrar_ip = "<REMOTE_IP>"2
       revocation_notification_ip = "<REMOTE_IP>"3
       EOF

      1

      The unique identifier is generated each time the agent is run. However, you can define a specific value by this option.

      2

      IP address of the registrar.

      3

      IP address of the verifier.

    3. Change the owner of the /etc/keylime/ directory to keylime:tss:

      # chown -R keylime:tss /etc/keylime
    4. Change permissions on the /etc/keylime/ directory:

      # chmod -R 600 /etc/keylime
  3. Copy the certificates generated by the CA to the agent node. On the agent node, do the following:

    1. Prepare a directory for the certificate:

      # mkdir -p /var/lib/keylime/cv_ca
    2. Copy the certificate to the agent:

      # scp CERT_SERVER_ADDRESS:/var/lib/keylime/cv_ca/cacert.crt /var/lib/keylime/cv_ca
    3. Change the owner of the certificate to keylime:tss:

      # chown -R keylime:tss /var/lib/keylime/cv_ca
  4. Start and enable the keylime_agent.service:

    # systemctl enable --now keylime_agent.service

3.1.6 Registering the agent

You can register a new agent either by using the CLI tenant or by editing the configuration of the verifier. Using the tenant on the verifier host, run the following:

# keylime_tenant -v 127.0.0.1 \
  -t AGENT \1
  -u UUID \2
  --cert default \
  -c add
  [--include PATH_TO_ZIP_FILE]3

1

AGENT is an IP address of the agent to be registered.

2

UUID is the agent's unique identifier.

3

The file passed by the include option is used to deliver secret payload data to the agent. For details, refer to Section 3.1.7, “Secure payloads”.

You can list registered agents by using the reglist command on the verifier host as follows:

# keylime_tenant -v 127.0.0.1 \
  --cert default \
  -c reglist

To remove a registered agent, specify the agent using the -t and -u options and the -c delete command as follows:

# keylime_tenant -v 127.0.0.1 \
  -t AGENT \
  -u UUID \
  -c delete

3.1.7 Secure payloads

3.1.7.1 What is a secure payload?

A Keylime secure payload enables you to deliver encrypted data to healthy agents. Payloads are used to provide keys, passwords, certificates, configurations or scripts that are used by the Keylime agent at a later stage.

3.1.7.2 How does a secure payload work?

A secure payload is delivered to the agent in a zip file that must contain a shell script named autorun.sh. The script is executed only if the agent has been properly registered and verified. To deliver the zip file, use the --include option of the keylime_tenant command.

For example, the following autorun.sh script creates a directory structure and copies SSH keys there. The related zip archive must include these SSH keys.

> cat autorun.sh
#!/bin/bash
 
 mkdir -p /root/.ssh/
 cp id_rsa* /root/.ssh/
 chmod 600 /root/.ssh/id_rsa*
 cp /root/.ssh/id_rsa.pub /root/.ssh/authorized_keys

3.1.8 Enabling IMA tracking

When using IMA, the kernel calculates a hash of accessed files. The hash is then used to extend the PCR 10 in the TPM and also log a list of accessed files. The verifier can request a signed quote to the agent for PCR 10 to get the logs of all accessed files including the file hashes. Verifiers then compare the accessed files with a local allowlist of approved files. If any of the hashes are not recognized, the system is considered unsafe, and a revocation event is triggered.

Before Keylime can collect information, IMA/EVM needs to be enabled. To enable the process, boot a kernel of the agent with the ima_appraise=log and ima_policy=tcb parameters:

  1. Update the GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT option with the parameters in /etc/default/grub:

    GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX_DEFAULT="ima_appraise=log ima_policy=tcb"
  2. Regenerate grub.cfg by running:

    # transactional-update grub.cfg
  3. Reboot your system.

The procedure above uses the default kernel IMA policy. To avoid monitoring too many files and therefore creating long logs, create a new custom policy. Find more details in the Keylime documentation.

To indicate the expected hashes, use the --allowlistoption of the keylime_tenant command when registering the agent. To view the excluded or ignored files, use the --exclude option of the keylime_tenant command:

# keylime_tenant --allowlist
    -v 127.0.0.1 \
    -u UUID

3.2 For more information